April 22, 2026:
Specialists in the PRC/People’s Republic of China claim that the country’s energy system is robust enough to withstand major foreign disruptions, including war in the Persian Gulf, disputing Western assertions of Chinese susceptibility to strategic chokepoints.
Because of supply route divergence via Russia, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia, potential blockades of the straits of Hormuz or Malacca now inflict less economic damage to the Chinese energy supply. Global economic interdependence and China's growing domestic energy ability further limit risk of disruption.
Strategic petroleum reserves, varied imports, domestic production especially coal, and rapid expansion of renewable energy have helped reduce the Chinese reliance on seaborne oil and augmented its long-term energy security.
The notion that China remains excessively dependent on foreign energy imports has obtained continued traction in Western policy discussions. Some analysts argue that American military action against Iran would significantly weaken Chinese energy security, while others suggest that an American naval blockade of the Strait of Malacca could serve as a dependable instrument of military and economic deterrence against China. Many scholars and policy experts largely identify no such liabilities. Few believe that any blockade of the Strait of Hormuz could be sustained over the medium, let alone long term, and many argue that the so-called Malacca dilemma has largely faded amid the Chinese diversification of energy sources and rapid expansion of domestic energy capacity.
The Chinese reliance on foreign energy remains substantial. According to World Bank data, China imported roughly 30 percent of its total energy consumption as of 2023, while the United States was a net energy exporter. This underlying dependence constitutes a real strategic vulnerability and helps explain China’s sustained emphasis on energy security. The key issue, however, is not whether such vulnerability exists, but whether it is as acute or as exploitable through military or economic coercion as commonly assumed. Much of China’s energy strategy over the past two decades can be understood as an effort to mitigate this risk.
Chinese experts generally argue that a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is untenable and unlikely to critically threaten the Chinese energy guarantees. Iran’s economy is to a large extent reliant on oil exports, so the Strait of Hormuz will have to open eventually. Iran’s blockade is limited and not intended to block the Strait of Hormuz, as Iran is selectively allowing certain Chinese vessels transit. Iran is not capable of maintaining a long-term blockade of the strait, which is why it has targeted vessels rather than closing the strait entirely. The new American announcement of a blockade of Iranian imports and exports may change that.
Chinese influential officials point out that China enjoys a robust and flexible toolkit to manage any potential energy disruptions. Despite escalating pressures in international energy markets caused by the Iran crisis, the Chinese administration has already established an energy security system including strategic petroleum reserves, commercial reserves, domestic exploration, diversified imports, and the rapid growth of new 21st Century energy 21st Century plan. Likewise, even if Iranian oil imports were removed, these supplies account for less than 15 percent of China’s total imports. China maintains over 1.3 billion barrels of crude oil reserves, equivalent to about 180 days of consumption, far exceeding the 150-day threshold recommended by the International Energy Agency. This also enhances the country’s resilience to supply upsets. In practical terms, Chinese analysts observe that coordination between China and the largest oil companies; Sinopec, China National Petroleum Corporation CNPC, and China National Offshore Oil Corporation act as a buffer that can cover import gaps, helping to stabilize prices and prevent market panic. Combined with regional infrastructure and diversified sources, these measures help manage any supply disruption.
Chinese leaders express confidence that the economy is well-positioned to absorb the impact of any market shocks caused by the Iran conflict. State-owned oil companies would absorb some of the market shocks and mitigate energy prices. Deflationary pressures in China also work in China’s favor in hedging against oil-induced inflation. This contrasts with the low-inflation environment of Japan and India, and it will help to manage price fluctuations, even if costs increase for corporations.
Chinese experts argue that the Malacca Strait is no longer a critical vulnerability, as the existence of other global chokepoints and Chinese diversification of energy sources reduce its strategic significance. The Malacca dilemma is a false proposition, claiming that the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean are strewn with U.S. naval and air bases, so the threat persists even without a blockade. Chinese noted in the same year that the Lombok, Sunda, and Miyako straits also would still pose threats, even if China could break through the Malacca Strait.
China has overcome the Malacca dilemma through domestic energy diversification efforts and the construction of new routes. Other experts widely emphasize that strong energy self-sufficiency, combined with diversified energy import routes, has greatly reduced the strategic importance of the Malacca Strait as a potential chokepoint. In 2023, experts saw no risk to Chinese energy security, assessing that China could reach a self-sufficiency rate of 80 percent. China imports oil and gas from 55 different countries, and new import routes from Myanmar, Central Asia, and Russia have reduced dependence on maritime transport via the Malacca Strait. Chinese experts further note that with Russian oil now heading south to China and India, China is no longer as vulnerable to external energy shocks.
Experts also highlight that growing military coverage demonstrates that China can effectively manage energy supply routes. Good relations with neighboring countries have produced new overland energy passages, and the Chinese Air Force operational radius now covers the Malacca Strait. With these factors in mind, he sees the Malacca Strait as increasingly insignificant. Some experts argued that the Malacca Strait may not even constitute a chokepoint in the first place, as international legal arrangements and the shared interests of major powers would preserve freedom of navigation there. Nearly all countries have a stake in the strait, and that no one country’s navy could block it.
China’s continued reliance on coal, combined with extensive domestic energy infrastructure, provides a robust foundation for the energy system. Coal reserves, which account for over 90 percent of the China’s fossil fuel reserves, have reached 280 million tons, enough to meet 30 days of consumption by coal plants across the country China is nearly self-sufficient in coal and has an extensive interprovincial railway-waterway coal transport network, which is an important safeguard for energy security.
Beyond domestic production, China's substantial domestic market strengthens its bargaining power with energy-producing countries, further mitigating the risks posed by potential chokepoints or external disruptions. Exporting countries need access to China's energy market. The global energy market, if the Iran War had not started, is a buyer’s market, a fact recognized across the world. Researchers at the Chinese Academy of Sciences CAS echo this sentiment, recently writing that the size of the Chinese market will translate to productive international relationships and maintain bargaining power.
In the long-term, the threat posed by blockades may further diminish as Chinese growth slows and it increasingly relies on renewable energy. China’s recent increases in energy consumption have been significantly slower than its alleged increases in GDP. Consequently, disruptions to imports today cause less macroeconomic damage than they would have done a decade ago. During the same period, the share of total energy consumption accounted for by clean energy increased from less than 17 percent to more than 31 percent, reflecting a decreasing reliance on imported oil overall and making China more resilient to energy shocks. It has been noted that new energy replaced 28 million tons of gasoline and diesel consumption in 2024, suggesting that domestic gasoline and diesel consumption may have already peaked. He believes that oil security pressure may decrease.
Chinese energy security is far more robust than is often portrayed in Western policy discourse. While U.S. strategists and some analysts continue to emphasize chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca as potential levers of leverage over China, Chinese experts reject the notion that these waterways constitute critical vulnerabilities. Despite continued reliance on foreign oil, Chinese scholars and policy analysts have argued that China has diversified its import sources, expanded domestic production, and built strategic reserves to the extent that China can absorb even a prolonged disruption. Additionally, Chinese investments in renewable energy, new energy vehicles, and overland pipelines further reduce dependence on maritime chokepoints. Its bargaining power with resource-producing nations also helps to effectively mitigate external threats. In short, the so-called Malacca dilemma and Strait of Hormuz anxieties are largely overstated, reflecting a Western perception gap rather than actual vulnerabilities.
These all ignore the possibility that China might attack Taiwan, which would result in a US blockade of China. This would not be an energy disaster for China, as its present need for 30% of its energy from oil and coal imports would be offset by the collapse of its exports whose energy use comprises about 30% of all Chinese energy use. The major US blockade threat to China would be that it would put about 30% of China’s labor force out of work, an event which terrifies the Chinese Communist Party.
A definite point to ponder concerning the Iran war is the collapse of Chinese relations with the oil-producing Arab states of the Persian Gulf, and with Iran if its mullah regime is destroyed. China has overtly sided with the latter, which attacked those countries though they were neutral in the war. The Iranian people hate their mullah regime so, if it is replaced, they may hate China as an aider of their oppression by the mullahs. This might result in a voluntary embargo by the entire Persian Gulf on all oil exports to China in the event of a war with the Americans.
These all ignore the possibility that China might attack Taiwan, which would result in a US blockade of China. This would not be an energy disaster for China, as its present need for 30 percent of its energy from oil and coal imports would be offset by the collapse of its exports whose energy use comprises about 30 percent of all Chinese energy use. The major American blockade threat to China would be that it would put about 30 percent of China’s labor force out of work, an event which terrifies the Chinese Communist Party.
A definite point to ponder concerning the Iran war is the collapse of Chinese relations with the oil-producing Arab states of the Persian Gulf, and with Iran if its religious dictatorship is destroyed. China has overtly sided with the latter, which attacked those countries though they were neutral in the war. The Iranian people hate their religious dictatorship so, if it is replaced, they may hate China as an enabler of their oppression by the religious dictatorship. This might result in a voluntary embargo by the entire Persian Gulf on all oil exports to China in the event of a war with the Americans.