September 22, 2026:
Last month, the Taiwan government conducted a test that reduced Internet speeds to the point where phones, computers, store checkout systems, and many more were useless for 30 minutes. The drill began with air raid sirens and ended when the sirens sounded again. These Internet disruptions occurred in fourteen different parts of the island nation. While mobile Internet was shut down, landline Internet and Wi-Fi were not affected. Many Taiwanese software and communications engineers could quickly create and implement stopgap measures.
But there is another potential problem. While Taiwan would continue to have access to the SpaceX communications satellite array overhead, this network would not be able to handle the heavy wartime data load. Taiwan depends on a network of subsea cables for telecommunications, and officials have said commercial ships linked to China have been detected cutting undersea cables linking Taiwan and some of its outer islands, as well as the worldwide network of these cables. The Chinese know that if they can suppress or temporarily disrupt enough Taiwanese communications, the military and civilians would be demoralized, and some might panic.
To address possible civil disorder, Taiwan regularly conducts civil defense drills to test emergency services' ability to deploy in a timely and effective manner. Civilians also face simulated emergencies and learn how to respond effectively. The military plays a role with its annual Ten-Day Drills that remind Taiwanese that the government is preparing for the worst, even though many civilians believe China would never go to war to annex Taiwan.
Taiwanese public opinion has long been divided, but if China threatens to invade, enough Taiwanese take the threat seriously and plan accordingly. Part of the annual military drill seems meant to reassure the public that the island can defend itself. This includes police training to prevent Chinese commandos from killing key government officials as a prelude to an invasion. The government schedules these drills, so they do not interrupt Taiwanese people's daily routines.
Most Taiwanese agree that these drills are necessary. A Chinese invasion is considered a strong possibility, and the government has expanded publicity for the 2026 civilian exercises. Government officials also emphasized that China has expanded its invasion fleet of warships, landing vessels, and missiles that could support the invasion. China continues to want to absorb Taiwan peacefully but realizes that a large-scale and risky invasion is more likely. China cannot afford to fail if they invade. Taiwan has powerful allies in the region, including the American Pacific Fleet and forces from Japan and South Korea.
A major CyberWar threat comes from China. Although it is nearly impossible to determine how much work is done by private companies or individuals and how much is state-sponsored, experts point to China as the undisputed leader in global cyber warfare. China is believed to have hacked the Australian intelligence apparatus, Indian government networks, and departments within the Canadian government. The U.S. suspects China of both sabotage and espionage of American defense networks, private corporations, industrial organizations, research facilities and industrial assets. Congressional panels have called China the greatest existing threat to America's digital security.
Taiwanese and Chinese CyberWar efforts against each other have supplied both nations with information about their opponents' plans and capabilities. The Chinese are also eager to know what Taiwan’s most powerful ally, the United States, is capable of and how Chinese hackers can destroy or disrupt American potential. These efforts gave China classified data about American dams. This was part of a Chinese effort to collect detailed data on American infrastructure and other economic targets to support preparations for Internet-based attacks on these facilities in wartime, or anytime. China also used spies inside America.
The U.S. government has known about this Internet threat for a long time and has been trying to develop a way to respond to a serious cyberwar attack in which the attacker does not reveal who they are. China could use the data it receives from its cyberwar operation for such an attack.
Early on, American officials created lists of the types of attacks that would qualify as an "act of war" and thus warrant a violent response. That would be easy if the attack caused substantial physical damage. This was the case in Iran in 2010, after the Stuxnet worm destroyed their uranium-enrichment centrifuges. Similar damage could be inflicted on electrical power systems, water and sanitation utilities, and certain industrial facilities, such as steelmaking, chemical, and refinery operations.
The big problem is proving that malicious software was inserted into a facility and caused damage. The big problem is proving who did it. While you can trace an attack, you can also, as the attacker, leave a false trail to another location (in another country). The Americans are apparently trying to establish widely accepted criteria for "network forensics" (investigating an attack and tracing who came from where, and for what purpose). At present, no such generally accepted criteria exist for proving who carried out a Cyber War attack.
The United States is apparently seeking to establish a method for identifying those who carry out these attacks and obtaining international recognition of their guilt, so America can then deliver some kind of retribution. This may involve nuclear weapons, but that would be a last resort. There are many other punishments that can be used, diplomatic, economic, and up through non-nuclear military actions. Meanwhile, the United States is hustling, at least in press releases, to improve American defenses against Cyber War class attacks. Catching Chinese spies and finding out what kind of data they were dealing in helps with this.